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Abstract. Online social networks based on a single service provider
suffer several drawbacks, first of all the privacy issues arising from the
delegation of user data to a single entity. Distributed online social net-
works (DOSN) have been recently proposed as an alternative solution
allowing users to keep control of their private data. However, the lack of
a centralized entity introduces new problems, like the need of defining
proper privacy policies for data access and of guaranteeing the availabil-
ity of user’s data when the user disconnects from the social network. This
paper introduces a privacy-aware support for DOSN enabling users to
define a set of privacy policies which describe who is entitled to access the
data in their social profile. These policies are exploited by the DOSN sup-
port to decide the re-allocation of the profile when the user disconnects
from the social network. The proposed approach is validated through a
set of simulations performed on real traces logged from Facebook.
Keywords: Decentralized online social network · Privacy · Data avail-
ability
1 Introduction
In the last few years, Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become one of the
most popular Internet services and they have changed the way of how people
interact with each other. The most popular OSNs are based on a centralized
architecture where the service provider takes control over users’ information.
Centralized OSN architectures present several problems that include both tech-
nical and social issues that emerge as a consequence of the centralized manage-
ment of the services [8]. If not properly protected, data of the OSNs can be
used by malicious users to infer personal information or to perform other harm-
ful activities [1]. Recent events have shown that, in addition to malicious users
(internal or external to the OSN), also the centralized service provider [10] and
the third-party applications [17] introduce new security and privacy risks.
A current trend for developing OSN services is towards the decentralization
of the OSN infrastructure. A DOSN [8] is an OSN implemented in a distributed
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and decentralized way, such as a P2P systems or opportunistic networks. By
decentralizing the OSN service, the concept of service provider changes because
there is no central control authority which manages the system, stores the data
and decides the term of the service. Instead, DOSNs are based on a set of peers
that take on and share the tasks needed to keep on the system. Therefore, DOSNs
shift the storage and the control over data to the end user and thus solving some,
but introducing new security and privacy issues. Among them, the strategy for
the allocation and replication of those data to the nodes of the DOSN which
guarantee the protection of the their privacy, as described in Sect. 3.
In this paper, we focus on DOSNs where each user is associated with a
profile which is a digital representation of the user including her contents (i.e.
text, snippets, pictures, videos and music, etc.), also referred interchangeably as
information or data. The privacy of the users’ profile data in DOSNs presents
new interesting challenges which involve two different aspects: (i) the access
control on the contents of the user’s profile, and (ii) the storage (allocation and
replication) of the profile data on the nodes which builds up the DOSN system.
Indeed, the user data must be kept private according to the preferences expressed
by its owner but, at the same time, they should be available to authorized users
even when the owner is not online. Most of the existing DOSNs implement very
basic access control mechanisms to protect users’ privacy, simply making a user
able to decide which information is accessible by other members. Moreover, these
access control mechanisms exploit only a limited set of the information available
in OSNs. As a result, the privacy support of DOSNs would benefit from the
adoption of an advanced language to express privacy policies which allow DOSNs
users to exploit social network-related information to define the access rights to
their contents. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, existing DOSNs protect
the privacy of the profile data allocated on users’ nodes adopting encryption
techniques. Hence, none of existing DOSNs take into account users’ privacy
policies to drive the tasks of the underlying support, e.g. to perform a smart
allocation of the profile data to the users’ nodes in order to avoid encryption
when possible. Instead, we believe that making the underlying infrastructure
aware of the privacy preference of the users may further improve the design of
the current DOSNs in terms of privacy. In particular, in this paper we focus
on a main challenge in DOSN which is guaranteeing availability of the data
without compromising the privacy of the data owner. To this aim, we propose a
framework which enhances the privacy support of DOSNs by:
– allowing users to define flexible privacy policies to regulate the accesses to the
content they have shared by means of a proper Privacy Policy Language.
– exploiting users’ privacy policies for making decisions about the allocation
and replication of the users’ profile data on the peers, in order to preserve as
much as possible the expected users’ privacy.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we discuss the access
control methods provided by the current DOSNs. Sections 3 and 4 describes the
approach used to allocate users’ data in DOSN and the framework’s architec-
ture. Section 5 presents the evaluation of our proposal by using privacy policies.
Finally, Sect. 6 reports the conclusions and discusses future works.
A Privacy-Aware Framework for Decentralized Online Social Networks 481
2 Related Work
This section provides an overview of current approaches used by DOSNs in
order to enforce privacy control over users’ data. In order to help users to protect
their personal content, current DOSNs adopt simple privacy policies by coupling
distributed approaches with encryption techniques. Typically, the users are able
to decide which personal information is accessible by other members by settings
a given content as public, private, or accessible to their direct contacts, or by
providing simple variants to this basic setting.
Table 1 summarizes the privacy options of main current DOSNs. In Diaspora1
users organize their contacts into “aspects” (i.e. groups of contacts) where mem-
bers can define access policies for each content by selecting the aspects that can
access it. In Safebook [7] user’s data can be private, protected, or public. In the
first case data is not published, in the second case it is published and encrypted,
and in the third case it is published without encryption. Personal information
is organized into atomic attributes that allow the user to define privacy poli-
cies. PeerSoN [5] allows its members to define simple access policies based on
individual users where the user’s data are encrypted with the public keys of the
users who have access to it. In LotusNet [2] users are able to define privacy
policy based on the identities and regular expression, that is a compressed list
of all the allowed content types. SuperNova [16] allows users to define the access
policy of a content as public, protected for limited access to a subset of friends
or private and inaccessible to anyone. LifeSocial.KOM [9] does not allow users
to define complex access policies but provides a security layer where users are
able to define Access Control Lists (ACLs). Vis-a-Vis [15] assumes that users, or
preferably providers of the storage services, must properly configure their access-
control policies on their platforms. Members of My3 [12] leverage their mutual
trust relationships to enforce access control on the access requests but the sys-
tem does not allow its members to define privacy policies on data. In Cachet [13]
users’ data are protected by a lower-level cryptographic hybrid structure that
allows users to define their privacy policies based on attributes. Members can
use friends’ identities and relationships as attributes to define two kinds of poli-
cies: identity-based policies that define user-specific access and attribute-based
policies that define access for a group of social contacts sharing some content.
In Persona [4] the access control to system’s resources is enforced by ACL. It
supports group permission policy by using either public-key with symmetric
cryptography or attribute-based encryption (ABE). Private user data is always
encrypted with a symmetric key. The symmetric key is encrypted with an ABE
key or with a traditional public key.
3 Privacy-Aware Allocation of Users’ Profiles on DOSN
In DOSNs, users are free from centralized service provider since every participat-
ing node can be a server and a client depending on context. The data representing
1 http://joindiaspora.com/.
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Table 1. Privacy options of the most popular DOSNs.
DOSN Protection options
Diaspora Public, private, selected contacts
Safebook Private, protected (group), public on profile attributes
PeerSoN Not designed
LotusNet Selected contacts and regular expression on content type
SuperNova Public, private, selected contacts
LifeSocial.KOM Public, private, selected contacts
Via-a-Vis Not designed
My3 Trusted contacts, 1st degree contacts
Cachet Identity or lower level attribute-based policy
Persona Public, private, selected contacts
users’ profiles are stored on users’ nodes, and they are available as long as users
are connected to the DOSN (i.e. until the user decides to log out the system by
switching offline their peer), after that, users’ data can not longer be obtained.
To enhance availability, users data are replicated on distinct nodes of the system
and reallocated to other nodes when one or more of them go offline.
This paper proposes an approach to preserve the privacy of DOSN’s users
based on a proper allocation of the data representing their profiles on the DOSN’s
nodes. This approach goes beyond traditional DOSN information allocation
mechanisms [6], which typically replicate users’ profiles on nodes that are chosen
randomly or among their friends, and which need to employ encryption tools,
that are inefficient in terms of storage overhead, to preserve users’ privacy. In
the following we will suppose that each user of the social network is paired with
a different node of the distributed system, thus the term user and node will be
used in an interchangeable way.
The main novelty introduced by the proposed approach is that it exploits
the users’ privacy policies to choose on which nodes the profile of a user U, say
PU , should be allocated. Our approach is based on the trust that the user U has
in the other users, which is defined by the privacy policy of U. Let us suppose
that U’s privacy policy gives to user V the right to access to all the contents in
PU . This implies that user U believes that user V, once accessed PU , will not
disclose his contents to other users (using the DOSN itself or other tools) who
may not be allowed to access them according to the privacy policy of U. In this
case we say that user U trusts user V for storing his profile in clear because, if
the files representing PU are stored on the V’s node, V cannot collect additional
information by inspecting these files, with respect to the ones he can access
exploiting the DOSN interface. In other words, the proposed allocation strategy
tries to store the files representing the profile of U on the nodes of those users
who are already allowed to access the data included in those files by exploiting
the DOSN interface. In particular, the proposed allocation procedure works as
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follows. Let us suppose that, initially, PU is stored on the node of U. To create
a set of profile replicas, and when U disconnects from the DOSN, an election
procedure selects a set of online DOSN nodes that could host PU (e.g., U’s online
friends), and U’s privacy policy is exploited to choose the nodes where PU can be
copied in order guarantee the profile availability while preserving user’s privacy.
Hence, U’s profile is moved on the node V if the privacy policy of U states that
V is allowed to access U’s profile. In this way, there is no need of deploying any
(encryption) support to protect the confidentiality of U’s data when stored on
V’s node because V is entitled to access these data according to U’s privacy
policy. Eventually, if none of the selected nodes are eligible to host the profile
of a user in clear, traditional encryption based approaches are used to store the
profile on some of these nodes.
Although the integrity of the user profiles is another important security fea-
ture that the DOSN should guarantee, this paper does not cover it, and it will
be addressed in a future work. Furthermore, we do not discuss the re-election
problem, i.e., the case when a user V, whose node also hosts the profile of user
U, disconnects from the network and the election procedure must be executed
to move both U’s and V’s profiles.
3.1 Privacy Policy and Reference Examples
The proposed approach exploits a Privacy Policy Language [11] to enable users
to define flexible privacy policies. These policies describe access rights by taking
into account dynamic features of users and contents derived from the knowledge
which can be extracted from the DOSN. The policy language that best matches
the requirements of our scenario is the eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) [14]: an OASIS standard language based on XML, for defin-
ing access control policy on resources. XACML has gained the most attention
because of its standardization and of its ability of expressing access control con-
straints on the basis of dynamic properties (attributes) of the owner, or resources,
or requesters, rather than on fixed values. The full details of the language are
discussed in [14].
We define a set of reference policies that will be used in the rest of the paper
both to illustrate the capabilities of our approach and to provide a clear evalua-
tion of the system under discussion. Differently from access control mechanisms
proposed by current DOSNs, our approach is able to both model complex pri-
vacy policies that leverage the knowledge provided by the DOSN and exploits
such policies to produce smart contents allocation that meets the privacy pref-
erences defined by users. In order to capture multiple privacy aspects of real-life
social networks, the reference policies are based on the the friendship types and
on the common relationships with other users. Moreover, we use an attribute
to model another key property of the relationship between users A and B: the
tie strength which is a numerical representation of the intensity of the rela-
tionship between two users and can be approximated by using the number of
interactions occurred between them [3]. Although the enforceable privacy poli-
cies are expressed in XACML, for the sake of clarity, in the following, we express
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the policy examples in natural language. Consider the user Alice. By using our
framework, Alice may define privacy policies like the following ones:
Policy 1. Only users who have a friendship relation with Alice can see Alice’s
profile.
Policy 2. Only users who have a friendship relation with Alice and at least k
common friends with Alice can see Alice’s profile.
Policy 3. Users who have a friendship relationship with Alice can see Alice’s
profile provided that they do not have a friendship relationship with Bob.
Policy 4. Only users who have a friendship relationship with Alice and tie
strength greater than a threshold t can see Alice’s profile information.
4 The Framework Architecture
This section describes the architecture of the proposed framework. We consider
a general DOSN reference architecture, without limiting ourselves to a specific
implementation. A DOSN is defined as a service that allows users to articulate
connections with the other users and share information with them. Each user
of a DOSN is uniquely identified and corresponds to a node of the distributed
network. The architecture of each node of the DOSN consists of two layers
where each layer interacts with a module, the authorization system, to enforce
the privacy policy.
– The distributed online social network service layer provides higher-level func-
tionalities useful for DOSNs’ users to manage their identity, profiles or con-
tents and to access other users’ ones. We assume that this layer implements
all basic functionalities and features that are provided by contemporary cen-
tralized social networking services.
– The distributed online social network infrastructure layer provides the core
functionalities to support the services used at the DOSN services layer, such
as overlay network management, storage management, bootstrap, information
diffusion, etc.
Figure 1 shows the layered DOSN platform described above (boxes on the
left) together with the proposed privacy support (box on the right). The privacy
support we propose is based on an authorization system which acts on both
layers of the general DOSN platform. At service level it evaluates users’ privacy
policies to regulate access to the contents shared by users in their profiles, while
at infrastructure level it evaluates the same privacy policies to allow the users’
profiles allocation mechanism of the DOSN to perform decisions that preserve the
expected users’ privacy. From the architectural point of view, the authorization
system is invoked by the Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs), which are software
components that have been embedded, respectively, in the service layer and in
the infrastructure layer of the DOSN. In particular, supposing that the node
in Fig. 1 host U’s profile, the PEPs at service layer invokes the authorization
system when a user V wants to access the contents in the profile of user U,
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Fig. 1. The framework architecture along with the general DOSN architectural model.
while the PEP at infrastructure layer invokes the authorization system when
the allocation component tests whether the node of V can be selected to store
the profile of U.
The authorization system follows the XACML reference architecture, where
the main components are: the Context Handler, which receives the access request
from the PEPs and manages the interactions among the other components of
the authorization system, the Policy Decision Point (PDP), which is the sys-
tem entity that evaluates applicable policy based on request, and generates an
authorization decision, the Policy Information Point (PIP) that acts as a source
of attribute values about subjects, or resources, or environment to the PDP,
which are required to evaluate policies, and the Policy Administration Point
(PAP) which allows to edit privacy policies. The PAP is invoked by the Policy
Manager in the service level layer when the user wants to set up or update his
privacy policy. A detailed description of the components’ functionalities as well
as the data flow between them is presented in [14].
5 Evaluation
This section provides a quantitative evaluation of the proposed framework. We
focus on the delay introduced by the authorization system in the user’s profile
re-allocation phase, since it is critical with respect to the system performance.
In fact, to provide the privacy-aware ranked list of the nodes where the profile
of user U could be copied, the privacy policy must be evaluated on each user V
which is online and has a friendship relation with U, thus simulating an access
of the user V to the profile of U.
With the aim of evaluating the efficiency of such approach, we have devel-
oped a set of simulations of our system using the Peersim2 simulator. We have
implemented a Facebook application, called SocialCircles! 3 able to retrieve the
following sets of information from registered users:
2 Available at http://peersim.sourceforge.net/.
3 Available at http://www.socialcircles.eu/.
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Table 2. Statistics of the dataset
# Users 144,481 Avg. clustering coefficient 0.63
# Friendships 3,683,458 Avg. session number 5
Avg. degree 486.9 Avg. session length (min) 6
Avg. modularity 0.46 Avg. inter-arrival time (min) 90
Fig. 2. Number of profile migrations and requests
– Friendships and Profile information of registered users;
– Interaction Information between users registered to the application and their
friends, such as posts, comments, likes, tags and photos. Due to technical
reasons, we restrict the interaction information retrieved up to 6months prior
to user application registration;
– By using the Facebook chat status we track the online status of Facebook’s
users by sampling all users every 8min for 10 consecutive days (from Tuesday
3 June to Friday 13 June 2014);
The dataset obtained contains 328 registered users, for a total of 144.481
users (registered users and their friends). The resulting Facebook population
has the advantage of representing a very heterogeneous population: 213 males
and 115 females, with age range of 15–79 with different education, background
and geographic location. Table 2 shows the characteristics of our dataset. In our
experiments we consider the users who are going to disconnect from the DOSN
and therefore their profile must be copied on other node(s). The simulation
duration is the same as the crawling period, so that each node exactly simulates
the behaviour of the corresponding user during the crawling, in particular his
connections and disconnections from the social network. For each disconnecting
user U, an election mechanism selects as neighbours the online users having a
friendship relation with U. Then, the authorization procedure is executed on
each user V in the set of neighbours, i.e., the framework checks whether V is
authorized to access the profile of U. As we model the profile of a user as a
unique object, access requests may only return permit (i.e. access level equals
to 1) or deny (access level equals to 0). It is important to note that the policies
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Fig. 3. Evaluation time of the reference policies
must be re-evaluated every time the user U goes offline because attributes change
over time. We have evaluated the authorization component for different scenarios
based on the policies described in Sect. 3, namely: (i) Policy 1, (ii) Policy 2 with
a number of common friends (k) equal to 2, 8 and 32, (iii) Policy 3 with a fraction
of randomly chosen users who are friend of Bob (n) equal to 2%, 5% and 10%
of the user’s neighbours and (iv) Policy 4 with tie strength (t) equal to 0.5, 0.2
and 0.02. Figure 2(a) shows the distribution of the elections triggered in a day,
i.e., the number of times a node disconnect from the social network and triggers
the election mechanism. The number of authorization requests performed by a
node in each execution is equal to the number of active friends and they are
distributed according to the graph shown in Fig. 2(b) (with 95% C.I.). Since
the number of executions and the requests’ number depend on the availability
pattern of both the users and their friends, they remain the same for each policy.
Specifically, the average number of online friends of each registered user ranges
between 4 and 287.
Figure 3(a) shows the average number of online neighbours who fulfill the
policies, as a function of the users’ neighbourhood size. Indeed, on the basis of
the policies, these neighbours have the rights of access the user’s profile and they
are good candidates to be chosen as replicas for the user’s profile. As shown by
the figure, the selected privacy policies allow the user to exploit several levels of
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Fig. 4. Evaluation time
privacy preferences. Figure 3(c) and (b) show the average time (in ms) needed
to create the XACML request (denoted as CreatingXACMLrequest in 3(b)), to
compute the attributes required by the policies, to evaluate the single policy
(denoted as Evaluation Policy 1, 2, 3 and 4) and the overall evaluation time
of each policy (denoted as ToT Policy1, 2, 3 and 4). The attributes used by the
policies are:
FriendshipAttribute: It models the friendship relation between two users as
a boolean value. Required by every policy.
CommonFriendsAttribute: It models the number of common friendship rela-
tions between two users as an integer value. Required by policy 2.
FriendsWithAttribute: It models the friendship relation between a user and
a set of selected users as a boolean value. Required by policy 3.
TieStrengthAttribute: It models the min-max normalization of the interac-
tions’ number that occur towards a specific user as an float value. Required
by policy 4.
The attributes’ values are computed on the fly, each time they are required by
the authorization module. The evaluation time required to compute attributes
increases as the number of the users’ neighbours. The computation of the Com-
monFriendsAttribute has the highest execution time compared to the other
attributes (see Fig. 3(b)) since it needs to check all the possible friendship
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relations between two users’ neighborhoods while the others attributes require
only to check for a friendship relation (FriendshipAttribute and FriendsWithAt-
tribute) or for a value (TieStrengthAttribute). Both the policies evaluation time
and the creation time of the XACML request (CreatingXACMLrequest) remain
almost the same for all users. The other evaluation times are negligible and they
consume only a few milliseconds.
In order to assess the impact of the phases that build up the policy enforce-
ment, we compared the percentage of time consumed by each phase as a function
of the number of users’ neighbours. Figure 4(a), (b), (c) and (d) show the mea-
surements obtained by the policies 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In the case of Policy
1, most part of the time is spent for the policy evaluation phase when the number
of neighbours is less than 500. As the number of users’ neighbours is greater than
500, the attribute evaluation phase takes more time. The same thing happens
in the case of the policy 4, where the impact of the attributes evaluation phase
grows as the number of user’s neighbours increases. For Policy 3 the computa-
tion of the FriendsWithAttribute attribute take most of the total time. Instead,
for Policy 2, the computation of the CommonFriendsAttribute takes more than
80% of the total time while the other phases remain negligible as compared to it.
Finally, the creatingXACMLrequest phase is negligible compared to the others.
6 Conclusion and Future Works
This paper presented a framework for DOSNs which allows users to define flex-
ible privacy policies based on attributes modelling the DOSN knowledge. These
policies, besides regulating the access to the contents shared on the users’ pro-
files, are also exploited to support the underlying data allocation mechanism of
the DOSN in order to preserve users’ privacy. In particular, we have proposed
a privacy preserving strategy for the allocation of users’ profiles, defined the
related architecture, described a reference implementation based on a simulator,
and presented some performance results on a real dataset, which showed that
the overhead introduced by our allocation strategy is quite low. In fact, in our
experiments, the total policy evaluation time ranges from 2 ms (for Policy 1) to
195 ms (for Policy 2), although it depends on the complexity of the attributes
exploited in the policies. Moreover, in our experiments, the policy-driven mecha-
nism provided by our framework always succeeded in performing data allocation
decisions that preserve users’ privacy policies.
The proposed privacy-preserving framework raises different challenges that
we plan to investigate as future works. We will extend the set of attributes used
in policies in order to ensure high degree of expressiveness demanded by users. At
the same time, a fast authorization evaluation requires caching techniques able to
speed up attributes’ retrieval. A further extension of our framework concerns the
definition of a support ensuring the integrity of users’ profiles. Finally, we plan
to enhance the allocation strategy in order ensure that the profiles are always
maintained available on trusted nodes based on the variation in the users’ privacy
policies.
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